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Since the last report on this subject made on October 31, 1978, additional 
data has been collected on equipment which may be affected by graphite fibers 
released from aircraft accidents and on evaluating the significance of the 
shock hazard on consumer equipment. As outlined in Figure 1, this paper will 
describe the vulnerability tests, provide some illustrations of specific test 
results and discuss the parameters which affect vulnerability. The shock haz-
ard for a hypothetical set of accidents will also be computed and evaluated. 
Figure 2 lists some of the conditions which bounded the parameters of the 
tests made in the Langley Research Center and Aberdeen Proving Ground test 
chambers. In general the tests were conducted with moderate graphitization 
fibers such as T-300, lengths were between 1 and 10 millimeters and with the 
equipment under test o~erating. Exposures were limited to values of 108 fiber 
seconds per meter3 , both for practical reasons of test duration, and because 
at this level very small national damage costs would be encountered. Limited 
tests were done with equipment either nonoperating or with simulated environ-
ments subsequent to fiber exposure, except for avionics equipment, in which 
expected flight environments were simulated. 
Figures 3 and 4 list the results secured. Many pieces of equipment did not 
fail within the test limits under exposure to graphite fibers or when tested 
with a fiber simulator probe. The latter technique was used in devices where-
in the number of electrical nodes were limited and could be easily sampled 
manually. 
Some of the parameters which affect vulnerability are shown in the following 
figures. Figure 5 shows the effect of fiber length on two pieces of equipment. 
The power amplifier shows a consistent trend with length. In the range of 
average fire-emitted fiber lengths (2 to 4 mm) the exposure required for fail-
ure are 
E= 4 x 106 (1/9,) 
This inverse trend with length is typical of equipment not protected with a 
case and/or filter. The ATC transponder has a nontypical response which is 
caused by the type of openings in the case. These are holes, approximately 
3 mm in diameter. The transfer function for fibers through these openings 
varies inversely with fiber length for lengths equal to or larger than the 
holes so that there is a relative invulnerability to fibers longer than 3 
mm. This size of opening is common in many types of avionics equipment as it 
provides adequate ventilation with sufficient electrical shielding. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the results secured with military specification type open 
terminal strips which are typical of those used in industrial 440V connections. 
Sustained arcs could only be secured under the conditions of three phase sup-
ply and with currents larger than 400 peak amperes. Equipment limitations 
were such that the maximum current was limited to 1500 amperes peak. It is 
believed that only sustained arcs provide a possibility of significant damage. 
The high levels of exposure required for these terminal strips, when coupled 
with the low transfer function which exists in most NEMA electrical enclosures, 
indicates that there is no serious industrial problem. When cooling air is 
forced through specific special case designs,each must be individually eval-
uated to determine whether a serious hazard exists. For the terminals shown 
the barrier strips insure that single fibers cannot individually bridge con-
tacts. The alleviating effect of this will be covered later in this paper. 
In our experiments local damage to screwheads occurred and eventually fuses or 
breakers opened, and it is believed that similar experience would be encoun-
tered in any protected industrial circuit. 
A number of representative results have been correlated in Figure 7. As was 
indicated by the previous listing, most consumer goods, 110V equipment and 
most avionics were found to be not vulnerable. The most vulnerable equipment, 
not reported herein, was equipment of 1950-1960 vintage, generally of high 
impedance and tested with high modulus fibers. At the time these tests were 
performed it was not known what the range of fire-emitted lengths would be. 
The test results which were secured over a range of fiber length, and which 
are typical of those used in the NASA risk analysis, are diagrammed in the 
remainder of the chart. There were no experimental points for any apparatus 
below the solid boundary line. The equation for this boundary is: 
This lower boundary is formed primarily by fan-cooled, nonfiltered equipment 
and by open terminal strips. For these there is no protection provided by the 
equipment case, or the forced airflow greatly enhances the number of fibers 
available to produce damage inside the case. All other failures are located 
to the right of this boundary. The demonstrated lower vulnerability is caused 
by case protection, the width of contact spacing, the invulnerability of spe-
cific types of circuitry or combinations of these factors. It should be em-
phasized that most of this testing was done with T-300 or equivalent fibers 
such as are now employed in aircraft construction. A partial tabulation of 
many of the tests is given in Table 1. Where no failures are shown the f 
values are the maximum values to which the equipment was subjected. 
Fiber resistivity also potentially can affect equipment sensitivity. Figure 8 
shows the result of probing the same amplifier with a fiber simulator which 
duplicates the contact resistance and burnout characteristics of a fiber. In 
the range of 3 to 7 mm contact gap lengths there were approximately 35 
failure nodes with T-300, and about one tenth that number with DE-114. OE-114 
is an experimental fiber produced primarily for its high resistivity. The 
actual average exposures to failure are shown on Figure 9. There is somewhat 
over one order of magnitude change in vulnerability shown in the tests done 
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with fiber on the test amplifier in the test chamber. This agrees well with 
the results secured by the probe. Two other pieces of equipment were also 
tested with fibers of differing resistivity. No probe testing was done on 
these more complicated circuits; however, the effect of resistivity is clearly 
shown. The relative slopes are greatly dependent on the separations of nodes 
and on the specific fiber resistivity. The large variation in the vulner-
ability of the color TV and transponder was not expected for the less than 
3:1 ratio of resistances of the fiber types. Insufficient work has been done 
to be able to predict the slope of the vulnerability curve against fiber re-
sistance for various classes of equipment. 
In order to determine whether fire-released fibers would affect equipment in 
a manner similar to those used for chamber testing a series of tests was run 
at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. These tests will be 
discussed in detail in a later talk. Figure 10 diagrams the results of these 
tests. Six amplifiers were exposed to soot alone, as a control, to determine 
whether failures would occur, or affect the vulnerability of the equipment. 
Two amplifiers failed, one during soot exposure and one subsequently. A de-
tailed examination of the failed equipment could not determine whether the 
cause was soot or not. The remaining four amplifiers were evaluated in the 
Aberdeen test chamber. The average exposure to failure was 0.8 x 106 for 
these tests. The change, if any, from the average exposure determined previ-
ously with 3 mm fibers, 2 x 106, is considered insignificant and is probably 
caused by normal statistical spread. 
In a repeat test wherein graphite composite was burned at Dahlgren six ampli-
fiers were again exposed. All of the amplifiers failed subsequent to an 
exposure of 5 x 106. At this exposure (measured by an electrical grid which 
detected 2 mm and longer fibers) it would be predicted that 6 failures would 
occur as shown on Figure 11. It may be concluded that the fire-released fibers 
have at least the same damage potential as the fibers used for chamber testing. 
Figure 12 further substantiates this point. Resistivity measurements were 
made of fibers released from fires at Dahlgren and during full-scale fire 
tests made at Dugway. This was accomplished with a wire-grid instrument 
wherein the voltage-current characteristics of each fiber that intersected the 
grid was determined. A continuous measurement was made of each fiber until 
fiber burnout occurred. The resistivity, when compared to the average re-
sistance of virgin cut fiber, is essentially unchanged. Other data presented 
at this meeting indicates that measured diameters of fibers are smaller than 
pre-fire diameter. The data shows that there is a high correlation between 
fire-induced diameter reduction and small fiber length so that the wire grid 
would not detect most of the fibers of smaller diameters and short lengths. 
The long high-resistance tail on the distribution plot indicates that a small 
number of decreased diameter fibers may have been encountered. 
Figure 13 outlines the test flow for commercial avionics. In this test series 
it was important to ascertain whether the flight environment subseque~t to 
graphite fiber exposure could introduce failures by redistribution of trapped 
fibers. Each device was subjected to an exploratory vulnerabilit~ test to 7 
determine if detailed testing was warranted. Three exposures to E = 3 x 10 , 
without intermediate cleaning, and with simulated environment after each 
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exposure were used. I~ the equipment did not fail, testing was terminated as 
the exposure to 9 x 10 was sufficient indication of invulnerability. If a 
failure occurred at any fiber length, four tests were run as indicated with no 
cleaning between the tests which were made at increasing levels of exposure. 
The results of this sequence are shown on Figure 14. It is interesting to 
note that for this equipment, tested under simulated landing shocks and 100 
db of white acoustic noise, that five of the fifteen failures occurred during 
simulated environment. The average exposures to failure for this equipment 
as used in the NASA risk analysis included the effect of environment as demon-
strated in these tests. 
A limited number of tests, not reported herein, attempted to simulate the 
post-exposure experience of turning ground-based equipment on and off, and of 
moving the equipment. In no case were failures encountered subsequent to the 
fiber exposure period in the test chamber. 
One other facet of aviation risk was investigated analytically to determine if 
a sufficient hazard exists to require some precautionary action. The effect 
of a graphite fiber cloud on existing and proposed terminal landing aids was 
evaluated. Figure 15 outlines the results secured on the 300 MHz glide slope 
equipment now in use and on the planned 5 GHz microwave landing systems (MLS) 
scanning antenna systems which will be deployed as per present FAA planning. 
There is no effect of concern on the glide slope equipment as attenuation 
effects are negligible, nor is there any problem with differential attentuation 
of the beams from the two antennas used in this system. For the MLS there is 
appreciable attenuation of the beam only in the very conservative case of the 
beam traveling through the entire length of the fire-ejected plume into the 
aircraft antenna. Even in this worst case the specified capability for the 
system insures that the range is not below 17 kilometers, which is still 
adequate. If the signal strength is below acceptable limits in the aircraft 
for any cause the pilot is warned by a display flag and will disregard the 
display until signal strength is adequate. It is most probable that during 
normal controlled operations the aircraft would be diverted or delayed if 
the fire plume really occupied the direct landing environment of the airport. 
The ground based equipment which generates the ILS and MLS signals is well 
protected, both by air-conditioned building enclosures and by specific fil-
tering of cooling air entering the equipment racks so that there is no concern 
with interfering with the ground based equipment. 
The shock hazard potential of graphite fibers has been investigated for a 
large number of consumer electrical items. A detailed report on method and 
results will be presented tomorrow by the National Bureau of Standards. Data 
extracted from their report is presented herein in order to approximately 
evaluate the magnitude of the danger nationally, Figure 16 lists all of the 
items considered a potential hazard by the NBS and subsequently tested in the 
BRL test chambers. Six items were tested. The toaster, because of the number 
in use, and the highest vulnerability to case shorts was selected for detailed 
testing. It is believed that there is no appreciable national risk compared 
to the toaster from the other five items. Figure 17 presents the results of 
the tests made on 6 toasters over a fiber length range of 1 to 12 mm. While 
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the absolute values are different for each unit, the curve shapes are all 
similar and follow a characteristic inverse E vs length relationship. For the 
smaller length fibers such as may be released from a fire the equation 
E = 5 x lOB (1/~)3 
provides a good fit to all of the data. 
To provide a sample computation for the national risk the shorting probability 
versus exposure relationship must be ascertained. Figure lB shows these re-
lationships for toaster #6 for each of three fiber lengths. While the 3 mm 
and 10 mm experimental points follow an exponential failure curve, as would 
be expected when bridging can be accomplished by a single fiber, the experi-
mental points for the 7 mm fibers are an indication that multiple fibers are 
required to produce a short. Similar results were secured for other lengths 
in other toasters, particularly for the shorter fiber lengths. The use of 
simple exponential failure laws for these cases will overestimate the risk 
for low exposures. It is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the over-
estimate without taking large numbers of data points to better define the 
damage curves at low exposures. Because of this, and because the computation 
will always produce conservative answers the exponential failure law has been 
applied throughout the risk analysis and will be used for the shock hazard 
approximation. 
In order to integrate the effects of a fiber spectrum so that equipment vul-
nerability in a fire can be evaluated it is necessary to summate the damage 
potential for all lengths. Figure~ 19 and 20 indicate the two methods by 
which this can be accomplished. In the detailed stepwise integration method 
it is necessary to find the exposure at each length and divide by the E, the 
average E for damage for that length. An overall summation across the length 
spectrum then provides an expression for the probability of damage; for a 
normalized quantity of fibers 
p = 1 - e -1 ";( Q, ) dQ, 
DOE 
If the length spectrum and damage relationships can be expressed as simple 
exponentials or power laws it is possible to derive analytic expressions for 
the overall integrals as shown in Figure 20. Dr. W. Elber has derived closed 
form relationships which express these integrals for various exponents of the 
damage curve and for various values of the ~verage fiber length, Q,a. For the 
case shown where E is proportional to (l/Q,) he has shown that an equiv~lent 
E can be used which is the E that occurs atV2 Q,a. For the case where E varies 
as (1/Q,)3 the equivalent E occurs at Q,= 1.B Q,a. This relationship is used in 
this paper and has been used to simplify the national risk analyses which will 
be presented in later papers. For most of the fire data to date average fiber 
lengths have been about 2 millimeters, so that computations presented herein 
will be based upon the E values which have been secured with 3 mm test fibers. 
An increase of average length to 3 mm would increase the E estimate by a factor 
of three, and the overall risk estimate by a factor of two (because of the 
smaller number of fibers per unit mass release). 
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The sample computation is shown in Figure 21. The assumptions are that 1000 
kilograms of fiber are involved in each of 5 fire related accidents per year, 
that 1% of the mass is released and could enter homes having average transfer-
functions of .01. The population and toaster density, 330 per square kilo-
meter is typical of a densely populated city and all of the fibers are assumed 
to land in that area. The results of tests performed on six toasters, re-
ported in detail in CR 159147 show that the E for 3 mm fibers for the average 
toaster is 2 x 107 fiber seconds/meter3. The tests also indicated that, in 
only 16 of 25 tests did the voltage to the case exceed 60 volts. In addition, 
when the toaster was energized, in only 3 of 25 tests was the fiber retained 
long enough to allow a measurement of current carrying capability. In these 
measurements the maximum current carried was 10 milliamps. When this data 
is substituted in the equation shown, the computed probability of a potential 
hazard is 0.38/year. This is not a large hazard (Figure 22) and is probably 
excessively conservative in that it ignores the multi-fiber failure relation-
ship, and the statistics connected with the distribution of user resistance 
to ground. Finally the currents which were maintained below 10 milliamps 
could produce shock sensations and secondary injury but could not themselves 
be more than an annoyance. 
The last figure (Figure 23) outlines the conclusions drawn from the data pre-
sented. The data collected and analyzed has been used in the NASA National 
Risk Analysis which will be presented in a following paper. While the data is 
restricted to T-300 or similar fibers it is believed that structural materials 
would have similar properties. Extensions of these data to other fibers having 
different resistances or fall rates is not warranted. 
The characteristics of fire-released fibers have been measured, both by direct 
measurement in fire plumes and indirectly by exposing equipment to a fire 
plume. The damage potential to electrical equipment does not change materially 
because of the fire. 
The failure rates for avionics equipment are influenced by post exposure 
environmental conditions. These effects have been taken into account in the 
national risk estimate. 
There is a negligible shock hazard in a small number of home appliances. The 
national risk is small and can in no case result in a hazard to life with the 
test fibers used. 
A final word about repairs. In almost all cases failures were cleared by 
simple vacuuming of the equipment. Where damage to components occurred it was 
not caused by the limited energy-dissipation characteristics of the fiber, but 
rather by upsetting a control circuit, or in the case of three phase arcs, by 
initiating an energy release almost independent of the fiber characteristics. 
For other than 3 phase industrial ,equipment, where downtime costs may predominate, 
the major cost encountered would be those costs associated with examining and 
cleaning rather than replacing components in the equipment. 
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TABLE 1.- SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITY TESTING FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
I I 
I: # of 
I '1 
nEr>1 FACILITY ! TEST MATERIAL LENGTH E TESTS REMARKS 
I 
i 1 .0 x 108 Power Supply LaRC Thornell 300 8.0 1 : No Failures 
" 
I i i 
3.0 x 108 
, 
Wall Socket I LaRC Thornell 300 I' 3 I 4 ,I 
I 
I 8.0 x 107 7 i 4 
'I I 16 I 4.0 x 108 4 
, 
: I! 
Quick Disconnect RADC GY 70 3 i .6 x 107 6 ~0.635 cm (0.25 in.) 
Terminals 7 .3 x 106 II Spacing 
: 12 .2 x 106 I 
I 
jl.905 cm (0.75 in.) 
I 
3 .2 x 109 
7 .2 x 107 6 : Spacing 
12 .5 x 106 I 
I 
3 .4 x 109 : 1. 27 cm (0.5 in.) 
7 .1 x 108 I Spacing 
I 12 .1 x 107 6 
'I 
II 
Gen'l Aviation Type 
5.7 x 108 Distance Measuring 8RL AS 1 2 No Fail ures 
Transponder (DME) i 3.5 5.4 x 10~ 3 No Failures 
7 6.7 x 10 2 No Failures 
Amplifier, Audio BRL Thorne 11 300 2.5 2.5 x 106 4 
Power, ~l a 7.5 5.0 x 105 4 
14.5 3.0 x 104 4 
Calculator/Printer BRL AS 20 7 1 No Fail ure 3.9 x 108 Thornell 300 1.3 5.9 x 10 4 No Failure 
Thornell 300 2.1 3.5 x 108 2 No Fail ure 
8.0 3.2 x 107 4 No Fail ure 
20 3.3 x 107 2 No Failure 
CD 
o 
ITEM 
Computer, MOS 
Open Circuit Board 
Computer 
Dishwasher 
Dryer, Clothes 
Heater, 1500 Watt 
Electric 
Iron, Hand 
Food Mixer, Hand 
#1 
FACILITY 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
I 
BRL I 
BRL 
BRL 
I 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
TEST MATERIAL LENGTH 
Thorne 11 300 1.3 
Thornell 300 1.3 
4 
4 
H~1S 1 
1 
1 .7 
3.5 
4.7 
7.8 
8 
HMS 3.5 
7.5 
10 
HMS 3.5 
7.5 
10 
HMS 3.5 
7.5 , 
10 
I 
r 
HMS 3.5 I i 7.5 
10 
I 
I 
HMS 3 I I 7.5 
I 
10 
# of 
E TESTS REMARKS 
7 2 No Fail ure 1 .5 x 107 5.0 x 107 3 No Fail ure 7.4 x 106 2 No Failure 1.2 x 10 2 No Fail ure 
6 9 No Failure, Off Mode 8.9 x 108 1.0 x 106 Est. 3 1.6 x 10 7 
2.9 x 10~ 1 Off Mode 
5.6 x 10 5 
3.3 x 105 10 
5.0 x 106 Est. 10 Off Mode 
8 3 No Failure, Off Mode 1 .0 x 107 6.0 x 107 3 No Failure, Off Mode 4.5 x 10 2 No Failure, Off Mode 
7 3 No Failure, Off Mode 6.0 x 107 6.5 x 107 I 10 No Failure, Off Mode 3.0 x 10 5 No Failure, Off Mode 
8 7 No Failure, Off Mode 1 .0 x 107 6.0 x 107 10 No Failure, Off Mode 4.5 x 10 
I 
9 No Failure, Off Mode 
7 3 No Failure, Off Mode 6.0 x 107 6.5 x 107 I 9 No Failure, Off Mode 3.0 x 10 i 6 No Failure, Off Mode 
'I 
1.0 x 108 
I 
3 No Failure, Off Mode 
6.0 x 107 3 No Failure, Off Mode 
4.5 x 107 4 No Failure, Off Mode 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
, 
# of I 
ITEM FACILITY TEST MATERIAL LENGTH E TESTS REMARKS I 
I 
Food Mixer, Hand BRL 
I 
H~'S 3 7 4 No Failure, Off MOdel 6.0 x 107 #2 7.5 6.6 x 107 4 No Failure, Off Mode I 10 3.0 x 10 2 No Failure, Off Mode, 
I 7 i",i crowave Oven BRL ! Thorne 11 300 1 I S.l x 10 2 No Failure, Off #1 . I (Clock On) 
4 i 5.0 x 106 Est.* 2 No Failure, On & Off 
4 ! 3.5 x 107 3 Off, (Clock On) i 
4 ~ 6.0 x 106 1 On, Low Power 10 6.6 x 106 1 Low Power I 
I S I 
Microwave Oven BRL HMS 3.5 I 1.0 x 107 4 No Failure, Off Modei #2 7.5 6.0 x 10 5 No Failure, Off Mode! 
I 10 ; 4.5 x 107 2 No Failure, Off Mode, 
Radio, Clock BRL HMS 2.5 2.0 x 10~ I 4 No Failure, FM I 
I 2.5 3.2 x 10 I 6 No Failure, Off Mode 
i 7.5 4.0 x 10~ 3 No Fail ure, FM 
7.5 1.1 x lOS 4 No Failure, Off Mode 
15 1.1xlO 4 No Failure, Off Mode 
Radio, Portable BRL Thornell 300 2.5 S 3 No Failure, FM 1.9xlOS 7.5 1. 1 x 107 3 No Failure, FM 7.5 6.4 x 107 2 No Failure, Off Mode 15 7.5 x 10 3 No Failure, FM 
Radio Receiver, BRL Tho rne 11 300 2.5 2.0 x lOS 3 No Failure, FM 
AM-FM 7.5 1.9 x lOS 5 FM 
15 5.7 x 107 3 No Failure,' FM 
(Xl 
-' 
0) 
N 
ITEM 
Tape Recorder, 
Portable 
Tape Recorder, AC or 
Portable 
Cash Register 
Stereo System 
Ii Tel ecopi er 
FACILITY 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
TEST MATERIAL 
Thornell 300 
Thorne 11 300 
Thornell 300 
Thorne 11 300 
Thorne 11 300 
Tho rne 11 300 
Thornell 300 
Thornell 300 unsz 
Thornell 300 
H20 sz 
LENGTH 
2.5 
2.5 
7.5 
7.5 
14.5 
2.5 
7.5 
15 
2.5 
7.5 
7.5 
15 
15 
?.5 
7.5 
15 
I
I 2.5 
7.5 
1
14
.
5 
J 
I 
1 .3 x 1 DB 
1 .5 x 1 DB 
2.0 x lOB 
7 B.3 x lOB 
1.2 x 10 
7.5 x 107 
1.1xlOB 
1 .9 x 1 DB 
1 .1 x 108 
1.4 x 1 O~ 
3.7 x 10 
7 6.3 x 107 3.B x 10 
2.2 x lOB 
2.2 x lOB 
5.7 x 107 
B 1.1x107 4.0 x 107 6.B x 10 
# of 
TESTS 
2 
2 
4 
2 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
2 
REMARKS 
No Failure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure, Off Mode 
No Failure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure, Record 
to Off ~I No Fail ure, Record 
to Off 
No Failure. On Memory 
No Failure. ON 
No Failure. Overnite I: 
Standby 
No Failure. ON I 
No Failure. On Memory 
No Failure. On, FM 
Stereo 
No Failure. On, FM 
Stereo 
II No Failure. On, FM 
I Stereo 
No Failure, Off Mode 
, No Fa i 1 ure, Off Mode 
,I No Failure, Off r4°~1 
co 
IN 
, 
ITEr~ 
Television, B&W 
16" 
Television, B&W 
19" 
Television, Color 
19" 
Television, Color 
25" 
Terminal, Telephone 
~ 
! BRL 
I: 
II 
I 
I 
I 
1 
BRL 
I 
I 
I 
BRL 
i 
BRL 
BRL 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
I 
TEST t~ATERIAL Ii LENGTH 
1 3.5 HMS 
I 3.5 
I 7 
I 7 
I 7 
Thornell 300 I 1 
' 2.5 
2.5 
7.5 
7.5 
16 
I 
AS 20 
HMS 8 
Thornell 300 8 
Thorne 11 300 20 
Thorne 11 300 1.3 
Thornell 300 2.1 
Thorne 11 300 8 
Thorne 11 300 7.5 
Thornell 300 2.5 
7.5 
7.5 
15 
Thornell 300 1.3 
4 
I # of 
E I TESTS REMARKS 
4.3 x 106 1 No Failure 
5.9 x 107 1 No Failure, Off Mode 
9.6 x 107 3 No Failure, 
1.8 x 107 1 No Failure, Off Mode 
4.2 x 107 '1 No Failure, Back 
Cover Removed 
2.3 x 108 I 3 No Failure, Off Mode 
4.8 x 107 3 
1.4 x 10~ : 2 No Failure, Off Mode 
1.1xl08 4 1.1 x 10 3 No Failure, Off Mode I 
6.8 x 107 2 No Failure 
:1 
7 , 
II 6.6 x 106 2 6.7 x 10 5 
4.7 x 107 4 
3.9 x 105 1 No Failure I 
: 
8 1 5.9 x 108 3.5 x 106 2 No Failure 8.0 x 10 4 
1.2 x 107 5 Back Cover Removed 
8 2 1.1 x 108 1.2 x 107 4 No Failure 6.1 x 10 2 No Failure, Off Mode 
2.5 x 107 4 
8.0 x 106 3 Frequent Recall by 
1.7 x 107 
Keying 
2 Frequent Recall by 
Keying 
-~~ 
- - -----------
(l) 
~ 
I 
ITEM FACILITY 
Terminal, Video BRL 
Thermostat, BRL 
(t~ill ivolt) 
Thermostat, 24 VAC BRL 
Thermostat, 110 VAC BRL 
Toaster-Oven BRL 
#1 
Toaster-Oven BRL 
#2 
Vacuum, Upright BRL 
_L....-. 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
TEST MATERIAL LENGTH 
Thornell 300 1 
4 
4 
10 
Ht~S 7 
7 
HMS 7 
7 
Ht·1S 7 
HMS 3.5 
7.5 
10 
H~1S 3.5 
7.5 
10 
HMS 3.5 
7.5 
10 
# of 
r TESTS REMARKS 
8.1xl07 2 Writing & Scrolling 
5.1 x loj 4 Writing & Scrolling 
4.3 x 106 2 Off Mode 6.6 x 10 1 Writing and Scrolling 
All 4-No Failure 
7 3 No Failure, Open 5.7 x 107 
1.2 x 10 1 No Failure, Open 
No Cover 
5.7 x 107 3 No Failure, Open 
1.2 x 107 
24 VAC Applied 
1 No Failure, Open 
24 VAC Applied, 
No Cover 
6.9 x 107 4 No Failure, Open 
110 VAC Applied 
1 .0 x 108 3 No Failure, Off Mode 
6.0 x 10~ 6 No Failure, Off Mode 
4.5 x 10 9 No Failure, Off Mode 
7 3 No Failure, Off Mode 6.0 x 107 
6.6 x 107 6 No Failure, Off Mode 
3.1 x 10 2 No Failure, Off Mode 
8 3 No Failure, Off Mode 1.0 x 107 
6.0 x 107 3 No Failure, Off Mode 4.5 x 10 2 No Failure, Off Mode 
IX) 
U1 
I 
:1 
ITEM 
Valve, Gas, 
(Millivolt) 
Valve, Gas 
(24 VAC) 
Transponder, 
General Aviation 
ASR-3 Transmitter 
Cabinet 
ASR-3 Receiver 
Cabinet 
FACILITY 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
BRL 
TABLE 1.- Continued 
TEST MATERIAL LENGTH 
HMS 7 : 
, 
HMS 7 
I 
AS 3.5 : 
7.0 
15.0 
HMS 7.5 
10.0 
7.5 
HMS 7.5 
7.5 
# of 11 
E TESTS REMARKS I 
6.9 x 107 4 No Failure, Closed 
6.9 x 107 4 No Failure, Closed 
, 
8 12 Three Failures .96 x 108 1.0 x 108 12 Two Fail ures 2.4 x 10 12 One Fail ure 
7 4 No Failure with Filter 9.3 x 107 1.5xl0 6 1 No Failure with Filter 3.02 x 10 5 5 Failures, without 
Filters 
5.04 x 107 8 4 Failures, with 
7.8 x 105 
Fi 1 ters 
8 8 Failures, without 
Fil ters 
co 
0\ 
I 
TABLE 1.- Concluded 
ITEM FACILITY TEST I1ATERIAL LENGTH 
ATC Transponder* LaRC Thorne 11 300 1 
3 
10 
VHF Transceiver* LaRC Thornell 300 1 
3 
10 
ILS Receiver* LaRC Thornell 300 1 
3 
10 
D.f.i. F.. * LaRC Thornell 300 1 
I 3 
I I 10 
I 
Flight Director* LaRC Thorne 11 300 1 
i 3 
10 
I 
- -
* Tests included exposure to simulated flight environments 
# of 
E TESTS REf.1ARKS 
5.5 x 107 5 3 Failures 
3.7 x 106 5 5 Failures 
1.6xl07 5 5 Failures 
9 x 10~ 1 No Failures 
3 x 10 4 No Failures 
9 x 107 1 No Fail ures 
9 x lOi 1 No Fail ures 
9 x 10 1 No Fail ures 
9 x 107 1 No Fail ures 
9 x 107 1 No Fail ures 
3 x 107 4 No Fail ures 
9 x 107 1 No Failures 
9 x 107 1 No Failures 
3 x 107 4 3 Failures 
6 x 107 4 2 Fa il ures 
- -
--
- -- -
• VULNERABILITY 
• FACTORS AFFECTING VULNERABILITY 
• SHOCK HAZARD EVALUATION 
• CONCLUSIONS 
Figure 1.- Vulnerability of equipment and shock hazards. 
TEST CONDITIONS 
A) T-300 OR EQUIVALENT FIBERS 
B) LENGTHS FROM 1 TO 10 MILLIMETERS 
C) LOW-TURBULENCE ROOM OR SIMULATED VENTILATION 
D) EQUIPMENT OPERATING 
E) MAXIMUM TEST EXPOSURES = 108 
F) FOR AVIONICS ONLY - POST EXPOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL SIMULATION 
Figure 2.- Equipment vulnerability and shock hazards. 
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WITH NO FAILURES 
• TELECOMMUNICATOR 
• BLACK & WHITE TELEVISION 
• ASR 3 
• CALCULATOR 
• CALCULATOR & PRINTER 
• TAPE RECORDER 
• ELECTRIC MOTORS (6) 110 V. 
• THERMOSTATS (2) 
• CASH REGISTERS 
• PORTABLE HEATER 
• MISC. EQUIPMENt 
-HIGH MODULUS FIBERS 
-RESTRICTED LENGTHS 
• COMPUTER 
• COLOR TELEVISION 
• DIGITAL VOLTMETER 
• ATC TRANSPONDER 
• VHF TRANSCEIVER 
• FLIGHT DIRECTOR 
WITH FAILURES 
• AM/FM RADIO 
• HOME MUSIC SYSTEM 
• CLOCK RADIO 
• 10 BAND RADIO 
• CAR RADIO 
• TOASTERS 
• ILS RECEIVER 
• DME 
• SMOKE ALARMS 
• IRONS 
• TOASTER OVEN 
• FOOD MIXER 
• CONNECTOR BLOCKS 
• QUICK DISCONNECTS 
• RELAYS 
• GENERIC CIRCUITS 
• POWER AMPLIFIER 
• MICROWAVE OVEN 
Figure 3.- Equipment tested in chamber. 
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FIBER 
LENGTH J MM 
10 
5 
WITH NO S1GNIRCANT FAILURES 
• REFRIGERATORS 
• FREEZERS 
• RANGES 
• DISHWASHERS 
• CLOTHES WASHER 
• CLOTHES DRYER 
• VACUUM CLEANERS 
• IRONS 
WITH FAILURES 
NONE 
• FRY PANS 
• BED COVERS 
• COFFEE MAKERS 
• PERCOLATORS 
• FOOD MIXERS 
• CAN OPENERS 
• PORTABLE HEATERS 
Figure 4.- Appliances tested with fiber simulator. 
DYNACO POWER 
AMPLIFIER 
(FAN COOLED J NO FILTERJ 
T -300 FIBER) 
ATC TRANSPONDER 
(CONVECTION COOLEDJ 0.375 CM (0.125 IN.) 
PERFORATED CASE J GY 70 FIBER) 
O+-------------+-------------+-----------~ 
105 
AVERAGE EXPOSUREJ EJ FIBER-SECS/M3 
Figure 5.- Fiber length effect on equipment vulnerability. 
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FIBER 
LENGTH 
M~1 
10 
3 
1 
INDUSTRIAL POWER~ 440 V.~ 60 HZ 
TRANSFORMER SUPPLY J 400 A < 1< 1500 A ~ THREE PHASE 
TYPE RATING C 
- - - 39 TB 600 VJ 30 A 14.3 MM 
38 TB 600 V, 20 A 11.1 MM 
105 106 107 108 
AVERAGE EXPOSURE, E, F-S , FOR SUSTAINED ARC 
M3 
NO SUSTAINED ARCS WITH SINGLE PHASE, TRANSFORMER SUPPLY~ 440V J 60HZ 
Figure 6.- Exposures for sustained arcs. 
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\ 
10 A Q R T B TV T \ 8 1950-1960 EQUIPMENT 
HIGH IMPEDANCE \ C 
HIGH POWER DISSIPATION Q A TV TV T 
HIGH MODULUS FIB~RS R B TEST LI1'HT ~C ~ " . / 
FIBER / / TF LENGTH // C TR r~M 3 / A T Q 8 R B ~ TV 
'// C 
FAN-COOLED EQUIPMENT /// 
OPEN TERMINAL STRIPS / / 
FORM LOWER BOUNDARY / TF / 
/ T 1 / C 
~-~-----.-, .. 
104 105 106 107 108 
-
AVERAGE EXPOSURE ,I E, F-S 
M3 
Figure 7.- Correlation of vulnerability with fiber length. 
60 
50 
NUMBER T -300 
OF 40 
FAILURE o FIBER SIMULATOR 
PRODUCING TEST DATA 
BRIDGEABLE 30 
GAPS 
3 TO 7 MM 
20 
10 
DE-114 
O~~~--~.~----+.------~----~~--~ 
400 1K 3K 10K lOOK 
RESISTANCE (OHMS) 
Figure 8.- Effect of fiber resistivity on Dynaco power amplifier. 
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FIBER 
RESISTANCE 
OHMS/CM 104 
-
-DE 114 
-T 300 
-HMS 
ATC TRANSPONDER 
~GY 70 
AVERAGE EXPOSURE, E, F-S (3 MM FIBERS) 
M3 
Figure 9.- Fiber resistance effect on equipment vulnerability. 
6i----, 
5 
4 
NO, OF AMPLIFIERS 3 
SURVIVING 2 
1 
O~-------------r------r-r--------+~ 
SOOTY FI RE EXPOSURE TRANSPORT CHAMBER TEST 
(WARM SMOKE) DELAY 
• SIX AMPLIFIERS ENTERED TEST 
• FIVE SURVIVED SMOKE ~ 
• FOUR SURVIVED TURN-ON ___________ --~------~. • i~~~~A~~;O~~~~G~~~N~AVE 
• MEAN E FOR AMPLIFIERS, SOOTY = 0.8 X 106 FAILURE RATE 
• MEAN E FOR AMPLIFIERS, CLEAN = 2 X 106 
Figure 10.- Effect of soot exposure on Dynaco amplifiers. 
1 
PFAILURE 
0.5 
E, 3 MM = 2 X 106 
IN CHAMBER TESTS. 
ACTUAL EXPOSURE 
N-- AND NUMBER OF 
0.5 X 107 
EXPOSURE F-S 
'M3 
FAILURES 
Figure 11.- Vulnerability of amplifiers to fire-released fiber. 
50 
40 
30 
PERCENT 
OF FIBERS 
20 
10 
o VIRGIN CUT FIBERS (T -300) 
(54 SAMPLES) 
o DAHLGREN SHOCK TUBE TEST (9-79) (251 SAMPLES) 
A DUGWAY TESTS <10-79) (28 SAMPLES) 
o ~~--~--~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RESISTANCE/2 MM LENGTH, KILO-OHMS 
Figure 12.- Fire-released fiber resistivity. 
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94 
GROSS VULNERABILITY TEST, 
3 X ]07) FLIGHT HIVIRm!MENT 
REPEAT EXPOSURE MID 
L--_---j FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT TO 
3 X 107 IN IIO STEPS 
Figure 13.- Test method for avionics. 
~ EVALUATION TESTS 
FAILED WITH FAILED FAILED 
FIBER EXPLORATORY NO DURING POST 
~ 
ITEM LENGTH TEST FAILURE EXPOSURE EXPOSURE 
ILS RECEIVER 1 NO 
3 NO 
10 NO 
ATC TRANSPONDER 1 YES 2 2 
3 YES 3 1 
10 YES 4 
DME 1 NO 
3 YES 4 
10 NO 
FLIGHT DIRECTOR 1 NO 
3 YES 1 1 2 
10 YES 2 2 
VHF TRANSCEIVER 1 NO 
3 YES 4 
10 NO 
13 10 5 
Figure 14.- Vulnerability of avionic equipment. 
ASSUMPTIONS: • 1000 KG FIRE 
• 0,01 RELEASE~ 3 MM FIBERS 
• PLUME CROSS-SECTION - 100M X 100M 
• BEAM INTERCEPTS TOTAL LENGTH OF PLUME 
EFFECTS: 
SYSTEM FREQUENCY ATTENUATION EFFECT 
I.L.S, 330 ~1HZ 0,05 DB NEGLIGIBLE 
(GLIDE -SLOPE) 
M.L,S. 5 GHZ 5 DB 45% RANGE DECREASE 
(SCANNING BEAM) (MIN, SPEC, RANGE = 37 KM) 
TOASTER 
TOASTER OVEN 
FOOD MIXER 
HEATER 
IRON 
MICROWAVE OVEN 
Figure 15.- Graphite fiber effects on landing aids. 
FIBER LENGTH .. MM 
3 7 
(6) 2 X 107 2 X 106 
(2) NONE 5 X 107 
(2) 7 X 107 NONE 
2 X 107 8 X 106 
NONE 1 X 107 
1 X 108 3 X 107 
TOASTER IS THE GREATEST RISK 
BECAUSE OF NUMBER IN USE AND VULNERABILITY 
Figure 16.- Average exposures required to produce short to case. 
10 
8 X 105 
2 X 107 
3 X 107 
6 X 106 
6 X 106 
5 X 107 
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EXPOSURE 
F-S 
M3 
Q TOASTER NUMBER 1 
~ TOASTER NUMBER 2 
~ TOASTER NUMBER 3 
<> TOASTER NUMBER 4 
o TOASTER NUMBER 5 
o TOASTER NUMBER 6 
o 
o 
<> 
o 
105r-----~------~----------~------~--------
o 2 4 6 8 10 12 
FIBER LENGTH - MM 
Figure 17.- Average exposure required for short to case of six toasters. 
EXPOSURE/AVERAGE EXPOSURE - E/E 
Figure 18.- Cumulative failure versus exposure toaster no. 6. 
F(f) 
0.5 
1) ALL FIBERS OF LENGTH i~ 
2) EQUIVALENT EFFECTIVE E; 
E AT j =./2 TIMES AVERAGE LENGTH 
-E IE 3) Pn = 1- e .l Q 
Figure 20.- Fiber length spectrum evaluation, analytical. 
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ASSUMPTIONS 
. 
EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
1000 KG IN EACH OF 5 ACCIDENTS/YEAR 
,01 FIRE RELEASE RATE 
330 TOASTERS/KM2 
TRANSFER FUNCTION) ,01 
E = 2 X 107} 3 MM FIBERS 
VOLTAGE>60 V IN 16 OF 25 TESTS 
FIBER RETENTION IN 3 OF 25 TESTS 
IMAX < 10 MA 
PPOTENT IAL = (N J [T ~F ,1 [TOASTERS] [PV > 60] [PRJ SHOCK Us E J AREA 
PPOTENTIAL = O,38/YEAR 
SHOCK 
Figure 21.- Potential for shock from toaster. 
NOT A LARGE HAZARD} ESTIMATE IS CONSERVATIVE: 
• MULTI-FIBER FAILURE STATISTICS 
• DISTRIBUTION OF USER RESISTANCE TO GROUND 
• CURRENT CAPABILITY IS NOT LETHAL 
Figure 22.- Shock hazard evaluation. 
1. A DATA BASE HAS BEEN COLLECTED FOR USE IN RISK ANALYSIS ON THE 
VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC} ELECTRICAL AND AVIONIC EQUIPMENT 
TO T-300 FIBERS. 
2. FIRE-RELEASE EXPERIMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT FIBER RESISTIVITY IS 
UNCHANGED AND DAMAGE POTENTIAL IS APPROXIMATELY THAT OF VIRGIN 
FIBER. 
3. POST EXPOSURE AVIONICS VULNERABILITY HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED 
AND WILL BE USED IN THE RISK ANALYSIS. 
4. THERE IS A NEGLIGIBLE SHOCK HAZARD FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF HOME 
APPLIANCES. THE HAZARD WILL BE OVER-ESTIMATED BY USING SINGLE 
FIBER DAMAGE MODELS. 
Figure 23.- Conclusions. 
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